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Abstract 
This working paper examines changing value systems in the new European Union with a special 
focus on religiosity and tolerance.  We found that few of the new E.U. members brought 
particularly intense religiosity into the Union.  However, two that did, Poland and Romania, and 
the accession state Turkey, are all fairly large states.  Post-materialist values and tolerance have 
both plateaued in early E.U. members, but newer members continue to align attitudes with E.U. 
policies promoting tolerance and diversity. 
  
  
Introduction 
Eastern enlargement has brought a new dimension to the European Union.† The secular regional 
European integration process of extending and securing peace among democracies of Western 
Europe now faces new challenges. As Peter Katzenstein (2006:4-5) explains this last 
enlargement injected religious values (Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Protestantism, and to 
some extent Islam) into the heart of debate over what are European values and future of the 
Union. That is, enlargement has brought back into the center of the EU what had been peripheral 
– renewed attention to how one might cope with secular and religious politics. He further argues 
that EU integration has failed to create a common European culture (p. 24-25) and that the best 
way to account for this experiment of half a century is through multiple modernities. Andrew 
Greely (2003) agrees with this observation and describes how enlargement revitalized religion as 
a political force in the EU. 
  
These observations certainly hand some support to the clash of civilizations argument of Samuel 
Huntington (1996) as the EU struggles to bring harmony and peace to 500 million people. 
Huntington’s main premise is that the end of the cold war ended one form of an ideological 
conflict and revealed the existence of another in the form of civilizations. 
  
On another level, eastern enlargement has brought together a mix of countries that fall into 
different categories of states on the cultural map of the World Values Survey (values, economic 
development and traditions, Figures 1 and 2 in Inglehart et al 2004: 12 and 14). What will be the 
impact of this mix on future value systems of the EU? 
  
The EU, to its credit, continues to push ahead with policies aimed at promoting and promoting 
diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance. This has been in line with the doctrine and practice of state 
neutrality on religious matters (Madeley and Enyedi 2003, Norris and Inglehart 2005). The 
Maastricht treaty outlines the principles of fundamental rights of EU citizens.† Article Six of the 
Treaty states that:  
 
1. The Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States. 
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           3  of  19 
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of Community law. 
3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States. 
4. The Union shall provide itself the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry 
through its policies. 
 
In the subsequent Article (Article 7), the Treaty continues to introduce a political mechanism in 
order to prevent violations of the principles mentioned in Article 6 by the Member States.† This 
clear commitment to harmonization of fundamental rights in the EU, and as internal borders 
disappeared made it quite evident that the EU needed a genuine Union-wide area of freedom, 
security and justice for its citizens and residents. That was why EU leaders, in Tampere in 
October 1999 approved a set of concrete measures for achieving such an ambitious goal.† The 
key product of this is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that brings 
together all the personal, civic, political, economic and social rights enjoyed by the citizens and 
residents of the EU. This is the first document of its kind that collects texts of all other relevant 
documents into a single document and takes the Union into a higher level of conformity in 
individual rights than found in previous documents like the Social Charter.† However, the 
Charter is not yet part of EU law as of yet because it is tied to the failed Constitution of the EU. 
  
The EU is aware of these shortcomings and took a bold initiative and declared year 2007 as the 
European Year of Equal Opportunities for All. The goal is to The to raise public awareness of the 
substantial Community acquis in the field of equality and non-discrimination, and to mobilize 
everyone concerned in order to drive forward the European Union's new framework strategy on 
non-discrimination and equal opportunities.  
  
The objectives include: (a) Raising public awareness of the right to equality and non-
discrimination, (b) encouraging a debate on ways of strengthening participation in society, (c) 
celebrating and welcoming diversity, and (d) working towards a more solidarity-based society 
(European Commission, http://europa.eu/scadplus/ leg/en/cha/c10314.htm).  The goal is to 
increase awareness on equality of everyone regardless of their ethnic, religious, linguistic, and 
cultural backgrounds.  Moreover, the EU will provide modest sum of funds to promote events, 
information campaigns, and surveys at the community and national level. 
 
The European Commission, in an effort to gain a handle on the problems of ethnic discrimination 
initiated the European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia on 18 June 2003.  
Subsequently, on March 1, 2007, the EUMC became the EU Agency on Fundamental Human 
Rights, the FRA, a permanent body dedicated to goals of understanding and eradicating racism 
and xenophobia in the E.U. member and accession states (Xenophobia, 2007). 
 
The European Commission, through the FRA will coordinate policy between member states, 
EFTA/EEA countries and Council of Europe member countries to promote the goals of the 
commission.   
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The EU’s ambitious project for harmonious relations between its citizens is found in the draft 
constitution that brings all previous declarations under a single document. Michael Emerson 
(2007:9-15) summarizes “EU values” found in the draft constitution as the 10 Commandments of 
the Union: 
  
“1. Thou shalt be truly democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law. 
2. Thou shalt guarantee the four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital, and labor) 
3. Thou shalt provide for social cohesion between people regions and states. 
4. Thou shalt ensure sustainable economic development for the benefit of future generations. 
5. Thou shalt reject nationalism and favor the multiple identity of citizens. 
6. Thou shalt assure federative multi-tier governance 
7. Thou shalt assure secular governance and favor multicultural pluralism in society. 
8. Thou shalt promote multilateral order in international affairs. 
9. Thou shalt abstain from threatening or using force against others without just cause. 
10. Thou shalt be open, inclusive and integrative toward neighbors that adhere to the above. 
  
Given this emphasis on harmonious relations, respect for all, diversity, and tolerance what does 
the present nature of the EU look in terms of religion and secular politics? Is clash of 
civilizations a valid argument and concern for future of the Union? Or is the EU immune to 
religious biases due to its successful secular politics of half a century?  
  
This paper addresses values in the new EU with a focus on religiosity and tolerance as a start of 
discussion for a larger set of variable in future studies.† Our focus is based on five older 
members of the EU (France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK), five recent members 
of eastern enlargement (Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia) two most 
recent members (Bulgaria and Romania), and Turkey (accession country with so much 
controversy surrounding its candidacy). Our choice of countries is determined by availability of 
data through the World Values Survey waves which includes the current 5
th wave (2005-2007). 
Unfortunately, the 2005 wave has not been completed and our analysis is limited by how many 
country data sets have been released to primary investigators.  
  
Model of Analysis 
 
The specific relationship between religion and intolerance has been widely proposed in studies of 
right-wing authoritarianism, in popular discourse, and because religion is one of the main 
markers of ethnic identity for many cultures.  A number of studies have explored potential 
relationships in religiosity and values of tolerance in Europe, observing and testing a variety of 
explanatory hypothesis. 
 
One study tested the effect of religiosity on anti-Semitism to see if anti-Semitism in the 
Netherlands was a product of exclusionary doctrine of Christianity.  The authors found that there 
was a positive, albeit somewhat weak relationship between Christian religiosity and religious 
anti-Semitism (Konig et al., 2000).  However, the authors found that Catholic religiosity had a 
link to secular anti-Semitism while membership in the Protestant sects did not differ from 
average Netherlanders. The authors found a much more powerful secular predictor of effect on Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           5  of  19 
anti-Semitism.  They found that a variable on perspective, “narrow perspective,” accounted for 
52% of the relationship between Christian beliefs and religious anti-Semitism while religious 
beliefs accounted for less than 15%.  They also found that secular anti-Semitism was also largely 
a product of a narrow perspective, with 70% of the variance in secular anti-Semitism correlated 
with.  The implication of their analysis was that the relationship between Christian religiosity 
and anti-Semitism was driven by the third factor, narrow perspective.  While the authors 
documented a positive and significant relationship between Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism, 
they established that the relationship was more of narrow perspective mediated slightly by values 
of a Christian religiosity.  Their analysis notes the relationship between fundamentalist 
religiosity and authoritarian personalities, and narrow worldview that contribute towards 
antipathy for out groups (Konig et al., 2000).   
 
Another study which was conducted on the Netherlands, hypothesized that religiosity should 
have a non-linear negative effect on intolerance.  The authors theorized that those who, “live” 
their faith will reject ethnic bias, while only those who claim an affiliation without being a core 
believer, or adhere to a particularistic faith will show positive correlations with intolerance 
(Scheepers et al., 2002).   The authors conducted a multi-level regression analysis of types of 
religious beliefs and behaviors as well as protestant and catholic sects of Christianity.  Their 
conclusions were that Christians tended to show more support for prejudice then non-religious 
people or persons of other faiths (however in the predominately Christian countries studied, other 
groups are the outgroups).  They also found that ethnic intolerance was positively associated 
with religious attendance.  However, they found a strong indication that the kind of religiosity  
practiced mattered.  They found a negative relationship between intolerance and doctrinal beliefs 
and the importance of religion in respondents’ lives, but a positive relationship between 
intolerance and religious particularism. The results seem to support a commonsense notion that 
those who practice a religion that values tolerance, will be more tolerant, but those who adhere to 
an exclusionary interpretation of their faith, will tend to be less tolerant (Scheepers et al., 2002).   
 
Their study showed the importance of using a multi-dimensional factor for religiosity, as the type 
of religiosity and the manner in which it is practiced changes the sign of the association with 
intolerance.  The authors do caution that the non-Christian religious individuals in their study of 
European countries are members of outgroups, and therefore unlikely to express intolerance 
towards the minority group to which they belong, a problem that persists in our study as well as 
minority religious respondents seemed to not answer the religious denomination questions on the 
survey.  Finally, and significantly to this study, the authors found that the religious heterogeneity 
of the countries in the study had a strong positive effect on prejudice, as did economic 
conditions.  Questions about ethnic bias may be more salient to those with outgroups toward 
whom misanthropic feelings can be directed. 
 
The findings of the multilevel study by Scheepers et al. Partially refute and partially support 
earlier studies on religiosity and bias in Europe.  A 1990 study of racism and religiosity in 
Holland found that their was some association with prejudice among casual church members and 
those who attended frequently but that the trend reversed among individuals who participated in 
church functions and associations.  They also found that the positive association between 
nationalism and religious participation almost completely suppressed the relationship between 
faith and bias (Eisinga et al., 1990).  A 1999 follow-on study that extended the investigation to a Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           6  of  19 
cross-state comparisons concluded that nationalism had a much more powerful effect on bias, 
and that the relationship between religion and bias may be spurious to that of nationalism and 
prejudice(Eisinga & Billiet, 1999; Eisinga et al., 1990). 
 
In order to investigate the change in values over the several waves of the World Values Survey 
and potential relationships between Religiosity and Tolerance, a series of indicators are 
constructed using responses from the surveys as observed indicators.  The changes in Post-
materialist values, tolerance, and religiosity are examined individually then as part of regression 
models to try and isolate the partial correlations between religion and intolerance while 
controlling for individual demographics and changes between waves 4 and 5 of the World 
Values Survey. 
 
Intolerance 
  
Variable selection for the Tolerance scale was driven by a number of factors.  First, the need to 
capture a broad sense of what it is to be tolerant, including elements of intolerance that are based  
in both racial ethnic and lifestyle dimensions.  Factor analysis of the Pearson correlations of the 
variables listed in the dendrogram above identified factor groupings similar to those illustrated 
above.  The dendrogram shows the nearest combinations of different variables.  Clusters formed 
around resistance to neighbors of Different Race, Different Religion, or Immigrant.  The second 
cluster illustrates how respondents grouped AIDS sufferers and Homosexuals together with Drug 
users. 
 
Figure 0–1: Tolerance Indicators 
 Dendrogram using Complete Linkage  
 
                         Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine  
 
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20         25 
  Label     Num  + --------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- + 
 
V35-Diff Race  2   òûòø 
V39-Diff Relig 6   ò÷ ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø  
V37-Immigrants 4   òòò÷                        ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø  
V36-With Aid   3   òòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò òò÷                      ó 
V38-homosexu   5   òòòòòòòòò÷                                         ó 
V34-Drug Add   1   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷    
 
Because so few surveys include question V39 (Different Religion) and it is correlated with V35 
and V37, at .57 and .51 respectively, it was dropped from the scale in order to be able to compare 
more states and more waves.  The scale tested for reliability with an alpha of .734, near the 
cutoff of .70 but judged worthwhile because it covered the different dimensions of intolerance 
that include ethnic, sexual, and general “undesirables” like drug addicts.  The range of the scale Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           7  of  19 
is left intact so that a “perfectly” tolerant respondent would score a 0, and an entirely intolerant 
individual would resist having all five potential neighbors. 
 
 
Religiosity 
 
Religiosity scale is composed of four questions regarding religious practice and attitudes towards 
God and the Church.  Cronbach’s of .87 after scaling all the indicators to z-scores and coding to 
make low scores reflective of low religiosity.  
 
Factor analysis showed that the responses to questions on religion tended to cluster around two 
concepts of religiosity, one of confidence in churches and attendance of religious ceremonies; the 
other cluster around the importance of religion and the importance of God in personal life.  
However, the limitations imposed by developing factors in SPSS using categorical data, 
combined with the need to find data spanning as many states for as many waves as possible, led 
us to settle on the four variables of religiosity in the table below.   
 
The Religiosity variable is simply an additive scale of the four variables z-score standardized re-
oriented to all align low scores to low religiosity and high scores to high religiosity.  Despite the 
realization in other work or the importance of multiple dimensions of religiosity in understanding 
the relationships between religion and tolerance, the data limitations, combined with the 
regression model structure narrowed the concept down to a single factor composed of the scale 
of variables below. 
  
Correlations: Standardized Religion Variables  
  
 Confidence: 
Churches 
How often do 
you attend 
religious services 
Religion 
important in life 
How Important 
God (Reverse 
Coded) 
Confidence:  Churches  1  .563(**) .626(**) .575(**) 
How often do you attend religious 
services .563(**)  1  .612(**)  .532(**) 
Religion important in life  .626(**)  .612(**)  1  .629(**) 
How Important God (Reverse Coded)  .575(**)  .532(**)  .629(**)  1 
**=p<.01 
Table 1 Correlations Among Standardized Religion Variables 
Demographic Indicators and Tolerance 
 
Using data from wave 4 of the World Values Survey ending in 2001, we include a brief review 
of the main demographic characteristics of individuals to be included in the regression models.  
The charts below provide easy visual reference for relationships that may persist in a regression 
model of the relationship between religiosity and tolerance.  One caveat is that the tables below 
use a slightly different tolerance scale than used in the Wave 4 and Wave 5 regression models 
below.  The tolerance scale below is additive but contains more religion-based ethnic identifiers Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           8  of  19 
for potential undesirable neighbors and not AIDS sufferers or drug users as discussed in a 
previous section. 
Income and Tolerance 
The chart below shows a persistent inverse relationship between individual wealth and 
intolerance across the states surveyed.  This supports the competition for resources hypothesis, 
but may also be a spurious relationship caused by correlations between wealth, education and 
intolerance.   It is very possible that there is a non-linear relationship between income and 
tolerance, and that once an individual or a country has reached some threshold the association 
weakens.   
Figure 0–2: Income and Tolerance 
Income and Tolerance
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* denotes p<.05.  Income Scale 1=lowest decile,10= Highest; Tolerance Scale 0=No Neighbors mentioned as undesirable
Tolerance value calculated by adding scores from groups mentioned as unwanted neighbors.  The following groups were 
included, Muslims (except Turkey), Homosexuals, Immigrants, Jews, Different Race.  Turkey score was multiplied by 1.25 
match 0-5 scale.  
Education and Tolerance 
The correlation between education and tolerance is fairly strong among the countries examined 
in Wave 4 of the World Values Survey.  The Pearson correlations between the indicator for 
educational attainment and the Tolerance scale are included in the table below.  The relationship 
in all countries is as expected- higher educational attainment is associated with greater tolerance.  
Examination of scatter plots showed that the relationships in some of the studied countries were 
non-linear, however the differences from linear relationships are not substantial enough to 
warrant inclusion in analysis. Analysis of the standardized coefficients for the regression model 
also indicates that there is no suppression effect of the age of respondents and the relationship 
between education and tolerance.   Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           9  of  19 
Figure 0–3: Education and Tolerance 
Education and Tolerance
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* denotes p<.05.  Education Scale 1=lowest ,8= Some University; Tolerance Scale 0=No Neighbors mentioned as u
Tolerance value calculated by adding scores from groups mentioned as unwanted neighbors.  The following groups w
included, Muslims (except Turkey), Homosexuals, Immigrants, Jews, Different Race.  Turkey score was multiplied by
match 0-5 scale.
 
 
A possible policy recommendation stemming from the observation of the tolerance effect of 
education is to include tolerance education in the more basic curriculums of the school systems.   
Political Self-Assignment and Tolerance 
The relationship between political self-assignment and tolerance is behind only age and 
education in its relationship with tolerance scores for respondents in wave 4 of the WVS.  
However, as with other demographic indicators, the relationship is certainly not universal among 
the surveyed states.  While most states with a non-random relationship between political 
orientation and intolerance show a positive relationship between right-wing alignment and 
intolerance, one of the states in our study shows the reverse relationship, Bulgaria. 
 
Tolerance by Political Scale
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Jews, Different Race.  Turkey score was multiplied by 1.25 to match 0-5 scale.
 
 
Other Demographic Variables 
Other demographic variables will be introduced in the discussion of the regression analysis 
results.  Many more models were tested than those listed in the tables below.  However, Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           10  of  19 
potentially powerful covariates to intolerance, like personal unemployment, and gender had no, 
or very weak relationships with the dependent variable after the items listed above are included 
in the model.   
Findings 
A quick look at the 4-item Post-Materialist Values Index from the World Values Survey 
indicates a mixed pattern for movement towards Post-Materialist Values for EU member and 
accession states.  Post-Materialist values are those that are thought to rise after basic needs of 
dietary and physical security are met in a society.  The de-emphasis on acquisition of wealth, 
physical security, and nationalism are captured in the Post-Materialist scale.  Of the 13 states 
examined for the fourth and fifth waves of the World Values Surveys only Turkey out of the 
recent accession states approached the levels of older member states Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Great Britain. More interesting to our question is the apparent 
achievement of a plateau in Post-Materialism scores among the earlier EU members between the 
fourth and fifth waves.  There is also no clear trend towards Post-Materialism among new 
member states.  So, while a general association between development and Post-Materialist values 
exists, the mechanism is certainly universal or linear as the chart below shows several deviations 
from a simple direct relationship. 
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Figure 0–4: Post-Materialist Values by Wave 
4-Item Post-Materialist Index
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Patterns of Intolerance 
Studies for the European Monitoring Centre on Xenophobia and Racism by Coenders, Lubbers 
and Scheepers (Coenders et al., 2004) were able to make a detailed examination of ethnic 
exclusionism.  They found a variety of concepts that were embedded in notions of intolerance 
and ethnic exclusionism.  The study focused on attitudes towards migration, but the hypothesis 
suggested in their analysis is still interesting to a broader discussion of tolerance. The summary 
report discussed the impact of national GDP and competition over resources may have in the 
level of ethnic exclusionism(Coenders et al., 2005).  Subsequent analysis of the European Social 
Survey 2002-2003, found the country-level characteristics GDP and unemployment rate had a 
significant relationship to resistance to ethnic diversity.  However, their hypothesis regarding 
competition for resources, was reversed at the national level.  Higher national unemployment 
was associated with lower resistance to diversity rather than higher.  Competition for resources, 
while not borne out at the national level (perhaps the salience of the issue is lower as workers 
don’t tend to flock to other low-employment countries. The results confirming their hypothesis 
about the relationship between GDP and tolerance are reinforced by a glance at the World 
Values Survey 2001 wave data below showing the prima facie relationship.  The Coenders et al. 
reports also examined a number of latent indicators of intolerance, beyond the scope of the EVS 
and the analysis here. 
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Examining the scores for the Intolerance scale in the chart below, the apparent relationship 
between level of development and intolerance towards minority groups is striking.  The five 
older, more developed EU members, show lower intolerance levels than the newest accession 
states and much lower than the very high intolerance scores of Turkey.  The one, very 
noteworthy exception to this observation is the resurgence of latent intolerance in French society 
during 2005.  Survey documentation hadn’t been uploaded as of May 11, 2007, but it is possible 
the survey was conducted during the 2005 riots in France.  However, riots in largely Muslim 
neighborhoods, does not explain the concomitant rise in anti-gay and anti-addict attitudes in 
France. During the same period, France’s Post-Materialist values actually increased from the 
previous wave, confounding expected correlations between insecurity and post-materialist 
values, or intolerance. 
  
Figure 0–1:Intolerance by Country and Wave 
Intolerance by Country and Wave
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Religiosity by Country and Waves 
In contrast to Katzenstein et al’s claims to the contrary, the countries in our study are not 
showing a clear trend towards a religious resurgence.  Of the Post-Communist states only 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia rise above the average score of all 13 states.  The only other very Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           13  of  19 
religious states are Turkey and Italy.  As for a resurgence, Religiosity in Poland has declined 
since 1991, but rebounded somewhat between 2001 and 2005.  Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia 
have all increased in Religiosity in recent waves, but of those, again, only Romania and Slovakia 
are even above average in very secular Europe.  Poland, as the most populous recent addition to 
the EU also has fairly high religious observance so does represent some shift, along with 
Orthodox Romania to a more religious Europe, but on different lines than those conceived by 
Huntington. 
 
 
In the countries with strong religiosity, in the most recent waves, Turkey, Romania, Poland and   
 
Religiosity by Country and Wave 
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Figure 0–2: Religiosity by Country and Wave 
Significant correlations between religiosity and intolerance are especially intense in the case of 
the more religious countries, Turkey, Poland, and Romania.  Two less religious but more 
established E.U. countries with significant relationships are France and the Netherlands. 
 
Correlations between Religiosity and Intolerance by country and wave show no clear pattern 
distinguishing established E.U. states and the newer accession or candidate states other than that 
there is generally a positive relationship between religiosity and intolerance.  One notable 
exception to this pattern is France in wave 5(2005) where religiosity and intolerance have a 
strong negative relationship during a period of rampant intolerance in France, possibly because 
more devout French are Muslim immigrants themselves. The relationship between religiosity and 
intolerance in the Netherlands, while it didn’t flip the way France’s had, declines dramatically Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           14  of  19 
between waves 4 and 5 of the survey eliminating what had been the strongest relationship 
between Intolerance and Religiosity outside of Turkey.  Also, as Bulgaria becomes more 
religious, it is also becoming more tolerant, with the only other inverse relationship between 
Religiosity and Intolerance after France.   
 
This first look at the relationship suggest some merit to concerns that a more religious Europe 
might also mean a bigger challenge to meeting the Commission’s goals on Tolerance with  
Turkey, Romania and Poland all showing observant populations and a strong association 
between religion and intolerance. 
 
Figure 0–3:Religiosity and Intolerance 
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Regression Models: Religiosity and Tolerance 
 
The two tables below containing the model fit statistics and standardized coefficients from 
regression models that attempt to identify variance components of intolerance.  The tables show 
that, with the exception of Great Britain, there is a relationship between religion and intolerance 
that persists only in the most religiously observant countries when demographic and national 
characteristics are considered.  The regression models offer only a very weak, individual-level, 
explanation of Intolerance.  The best adjusted R-squared from Wave 4 was 27% of variance in 
intolerance for Turkey was accounted for, then in the 2005 wave, wave 5, the model accounts for 
14% of variance in France.  Judging from the observations in the charts above, a multi-level 
model including state-level information might account for significantly more variance. Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           15  of  19 
 
The two most consistently significant indicators of intolerance are education and age, the first 
inversely and the second directly correlated to intolerance.  In Wave 4, 1999-2001, the 
coefficients indicate that Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovakia, three of the newest members, had no 
significant partial correlation between education and intolerance.  The only other state to show a 
non-significant relationship was Great Britain, but only because of a strong suppression effect 
introduced with the inclusion of the Post-Materialism scale.  By the 2005 wave, Bulgaria has a 
strong relationship indicating that increased education reduces intolerance.   
 
France, in the 2005 wave is anomalous.  It has a strong positive association between intolerance 
and education (.103) and a strong negative correlation between religiosity and intolerance—the 
reverse of all other associations.  Again, it is possible that the relatively high religiosity and low 
education of immigrants, combined with the interactions among lower class workers of different 
races might contribute to this inversion of expected relationships. 
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Country Wave Model Adj. R^2 (Constant)
Size of 
town
Scale of 
incomes
Highest 
educational 
level attained Age Religiosity
Self positioning 
in political 
scale
Religion by 
Politics
Post-
Materialist 
index 4-item
1 0.041 2.910 -0.147* -0.072 -0.047 0.046
2 0.040 2.912 -0.148* -0.070 -0.045 0.046 0.020
3 0.040 3.068 -0.145* -0.065 -0.042 0.040 0.029 -0.043
4 0.041 3.057 -0.144* -0.065 -0.040 0.044 0.029 -0.045 -0.053
5 0.040 2.989 -0.144* -0.066 -0.045 0.045 0.028 -0.046 -0.053 0.021
1 0.045 1.288 -0.027 0.012 -0.146* 0.172*
2 0.044 1.244 -0.028 0.011 -0.145* 0.178* -0.026
3 0.044 1.353 -0.026 0.016 -0.143* 0.172* -0.018 -0.032
4 0.043 1.358 -0.027 0.015 -0.143* 0.174* -0.016 -0.033 -0.022
5 0.058 1.736 -0.023 0.018 -0.122* 0.169* -0.019 -0.008 -0.020 -0.132*
1 0.039 1.648 0.025 -0.047 -0.046 0.181*
2 0.037 1.640 0.025 -0.047 -0.046 0.182* -0.006
3 0.035 1.596 0.025 -0.049 -0.045 0.182* -0.006 0.010
4 0.037 1.611 0.025 -0.048 -0.045 0.18* -0.005 0.008 0.055
5 0.035 1.688 0.024 -0.048 -0.042 0.179* -0.005 0.010 0.055 -0.023
1 0.060 1.091 -0.064 -0.054 -0.145* 0.121*
2 0.068 1.242 -0.070 -0.050 -0.145* 0.098* 0.101*
3 0.080 0.894 -0.062 -0.055 -0.14* 0.097* 0.068 0.117*
4 0.078 0.900 -0.063 -0.055 -0.141* 0.096* 0.068 0.117* 0.010
5 0.096 1.399 -0.054 -0.042 -0.114* 0.083* 0.054 0.097* 0.014 -0.148*
1 0.042 1.428 -0.054 -0.030 -0.174* 0.057
2 0.041 1.422 -0.054 -0.029 -0.174* 0.058 -0.005
3 0.052 1.040 -0.050 -0.033 -0.164* 0.051 -0.025 0.118*
4 0.052 1.048 -0.051 -0.030 -0.167* 0.047 -0.026 0.117* 0.037
5 0.075 1.583 -0.041 -0.033 -0.142* 0.015 -0.017 0.109* 0.043 -0.165*
1 0.085 1.606 0.006 -0.040 -0.207* 0.124*
2 0.084 1.585 0.010 -0.038 -0.206* 0.12* 0.026
3 0.095 1.187 0.013 -0.043 -0.204* 0.122* 0.001 0.111*
4 0.094 1.199 0.014 -0.043 -0.203* 0.124* -0.003 0.108* -0.022
5 0.102 1.719 0.011 -0.042 -0.179* 0.116* -0.010 0.101* -0.018 -0.106*
1 0.058 0.793 -0.013 0.002 -0.115* 0.2*
2 0.062 0.827 -0.006 0.008 -0.115* 0.181* 0.074*
3 0.080 0.420 0.005 -0.018 -0.091* 0.185* 0.045 0.145*
4 0.085 0.395 0.006 -0.014 -0.09* 0.181* 0.033 0.146* 0.075*
5 0.099 0.736 0.012 -0.005 -0.068 0.187* 0.023 0.129* 0.077* -0.127*
1 0.131 1.548 -0.069 0.053 -0.198* 0.276*
2 0.133 1.447 -0.062 0.053 -0.19* 0.271* 0.052
3 0.133 1.553 -0.057 0.059 -0.19* 0.272* 0.067 -0.046
4 0.132 1.556 -0.056 0.060 -0.191* 0.27* 0.071 -0.048 0.012
5 0.134 1.344 -0.053 0.054 -0.198* 0.27* 0.08* -0.051 0.010 0.056
1 0.111 2.982 -0.071 -0.091 -0.207* 0.113*
2 0.118 2.816 -0.057 -0.084 -0.2* 0.096* 0.099*
3 0.117 2.671 -0.055 -0.084 -0.198* 0.101* 0.098* 0.030
4 0.115 2.652 -0.053 -0.082 -0.199* 0.1* 0.099* 0.032 0.015
5 0.117 2.822 -0.045 -0.079 -0.19* 0.1* 0.092* 0.036 0.008 -0.059
1 -0.001 2.080 0.007 -0.023 -0.020 0.043
2 0.001 2.057 0.016 -0.020 -0.015 0.030 0.065
3 0.000 2.122 0.017 -0.018 -0.014 0.029 0.071 -0.020
4 -0.001 2.108 0.018 -0.018 -0.014 0.031 0.070 -0.018 -0.015
5 0.001 2.295 0.021 -0.015 -0.008 0.024 0.069 -0.010 -0.013 -0.059
1 0.216 4.789 -0.163* -0.191* -0.248* 0.001
2 0.260 4.346 -0.131* -0.159* -0.213* -0.029 0.228*
3 0.265 4.136 -0.124* -0.165* -0.205* -0.035 0.197* 0.083*
4 0.270 4.246 -0.129* -0.167* -0.205* -0.028 0.155* 0.078* -0.088*
5 0.269 4.270 -0.129* -0.167* -0.204* -0.028 0.155* 0.077* -0.087* -0.005
1 0.050 1.663 -0.085 0.086 -0.152* 0.129*
2 0.049 1.606 -0.083 0.088 -0.15* 0.134* -0.023
3 0.058 1.251 -0.082 0.085 -0.153* 0.119* -0.034 0.103*
4 0.056 1.251 -0.082 0.085 -0.154* 0.119* -0.034 0.104* 0.005
Bulgaria (4)
Slovakia (4)
Czech Republic (4)
Estonia (4)
France (4)
Germany (4)
Italy (4)
Netherlands (4)
Poland (4)
Romania (4)
Turkey (4)
Great Britain (4)  
Table 2: Coefficients for Wave 4 
In both waves, self-assigned political alignment was a much bigger indicator of intolerance than 
religiosity by itself.  In only Turkey and Romania does the significant effect of religiosity remain 
bigger than that of self-assigned alignment, however by wave 5, Romania no longer shows a 
significant relationship between intolerance and religiosity or self-assigned political alignment.    
  
France, in wave 5, returns scores that are completely anomalous.  Education is associated with 
increased intolerance, age associated with more tolerant outlooks, religiosity is significantly 
inversely correlated with intolerance, and right-wingers are associated with more tolerant 
attitudes.    Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           17  of  19 
 
Country Model
Adjusted 
R^2 Intercept
Size of 
town
Scale of 
incomes
Highest 
educational 
level attained Age Religiosity
Self 
positioning in 
political scale
Religion by 
Politics
Post-
Materialist 
index 12-
item
Bulgaria 1 0.028 2.015 0.071 0.019 -0.151* 0.112*
Bulgaria 2 0.031 2.063 0.072 0.015 -0.158* 0.108* -0.069
Bulgaria 3 0.03 1.971 0.068 0.010 -0.159* 0.113* -0.072 0.031
Bulgaria 4 0.029 1.972 0.068 0.010 -0.16* 0.113* -0.072 0.031 0.008
Bulgaria 5 0.028 2.026 0.070 0.012 -0.157* 0.109* -0.073 0.033 0.007 -0.033
France 1 0.092 3.58 -0.037 0.005 0.172* -0.199*
France 2 0.102 3.405 -0.034 0.005 0.172* -0.179* -0.105*
France 3 0.117 3.856 -0.033 0.017 0.164* -0.174* -0.076* -0.132*
France 4 0.117 3.872 -0.031 0.015 0.161* -0.18* -0.076* -0.131* 0.036
France 5 0.139 3.465 -0.036 0.011 0.103* -0.185* -0.073* -0.108* 0.021 0.164*
Germany 1 0.043 0.901 0.093* -0.026 -0.139* 0.114*
Germany 2 0.042 0.875 0.093* -0.023 -0.141* 0.118* -0.017
Germany 3 0.064 0.376 0.103* -0.027 -0.115* 0.117* -0.030 0.156*
Germany 4 0.063 0.377 0.103* -0.027 -0.114* 0.118* -0.030 0.156* -0.005
Germany 5 0.082 0.87 0.09* -0.035 -0.082* 0.099* -0.032 0.136* -0.009 -0.151*
Italy 1 0.065 1.066 0.007 -0.054 -0.12* 0.184*
Italy 2 0.065 1.062 0.008 -0.051 -0.121* 0.174* 0.045
Italy 3 0.096 0.561 0.025 -0.085 -0.108* 0.172* -0.007 0.19*
Italy 4 0.094 0.563 0.025 -0.085 -0.108* 0.173* -0.008 0.188* -0.008
Italy 5 0.117 1.062 0.014 -0.076 -0.076 0.161* 0.009 0.142* -0.008 -0.169*
Netherlands 1 0.029 1.544 -0.024 -0.08 -0.14* 0.025
Netherlands 2 0.029 1.511 -0.026 -0.081 -0.137* 0.032 -0.04
Netherlands 3 0.073 0.963 -0.013 -0.118* -0.103* 0.04 -0.078* 0.221*
Netherlands 4 0.076 0.971 -0.013 -0.115* -0.106* 0.047 -0.066 0.218* -0.069
Netherlands 5 0.085 1.18 -0.01 -0.114* -0.086* 0.046 -0.071 0.191* -0.055 -0.106*
Poland 1 0.063 2.045 0.040 -0.050 -0.181* 0.135*
Poland 2 0.066 2.045 0.060 -0.046 -0.183* 0.125* 0.070
Poland 3 0.07 1.925 0.047 -0.048 -0.173* 0.128* 0.039 0.08*
Poland 4 0.07 1.686 0.048 -0.048 -0.174* 0.132* 0.031 0.078 -0.036
Poland 5 0.074 1.706 0.051 -0.049 -0.171* 0.115* 0.037 0.073 -0.030 -0.074
Romania 1 0.046 1.97 -0.103* -0.005 -0.074 0.152*
Romania 2 0.048 1.995 -0.098 -0.005 -0.060 0.146* 0.069
Romania 3 0.046 1.822 -0.098 -0.005 -0.059 0.144* 0.069 -0.018
Romania 4 0.044 1.886 -0.099 -0.005 -0.060 0.144* 0.067 -0.018 0.021
Romania 5 0.061 1.898 -0.089 -0.003 -0.041 0.134* 0.060 -0.008 0.016 -0.141*
Great Britain 1 0.066 2.141 0.011 -0.026 -0.153* 0.178*
Great Britain 2 0.065 1.259 0.009 -0.024 -0.155* 0.176* 0.015
Great Britain 3 0.067 1.274 0.011 -0.032 -0.149* 0.17* 0.007 0.057
Great Britain 4 0.068 1.123 0.006 -0.028 -0.151* 0.174* 0.003 0.059 0.057
Great Britain 5 0.094 1.12 0.010 -0.028 -0.124* 0.171* 0.011 0.017 0.059  
 Table 3: Wave 5, Regression Coefficients 
 
Conclusions 
This study provides an initial attempt to understand the role of religiosity in new European 
Union.  In light of differing views on this subject explained above, we attempted to look at how 
religiosity affects other values in older and newer members of the EU.  Much needs to be done to 
futher examine this subject in a more in-depth fashion. However, our analysis shows some 
important findings based on solid survey data.  First we found weak support for assertion of 
resurgent religion in expanded EU. We did find that more religious countries like Poland, 
Romania and Turkey have stronger correlations between Religiosity and Intolerance.  Once 
demographics and political self-assignment are included, effects are moderated except for 
Romania, Turkey and Britain in Wave 4, and France in the WVS wave 5. France’s intolerance 
spiked during wave 5.  All coefficients for the French are reverse of expectations in wave 5.  
Possibly because of the very high intercept of the France Wave 5 regression model.  Implications 
of our findings for public policy can be summarized as: 
 
• The show of correlations between education and tolerance indicates that the strength of 
intolerance may continue to moderate as accession states develop along a more EU-focused 
education policy. Yeşilada-Noordijk-Webster           18  of  19 
• Intolerance among right-wing political self-identifiers may lead to an opportunity for education 
to establish a cultural unacceptability of intolerance and reduce the likelihood of “anti-system” 
activism by right-wing politicians. 
• In light of the difference in French results between the 2001 and 2005 waves, the causes of that 
change need to be understood in order to be anticipated. During the same period as the French 
experienced their riots, England suffered the subway attacks, yet British intolerance levels 
declined, particularly towards immigrants. Is this a result of political leadership, or greater latent 
authoritarianism in France? 
• Political parties that integrate religious markers as part of their in-group identity need to be 
monitored and countered for peddling intolerance as ideology. 
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